Meeting to be held on Thursday 1 October 2026
(Appendix A - Risk Matrix)
Contact for further information - Steven Brown, Director of Corporate Services (DoCS) Telephone Number: 01772 866804
Executive SummaryLancashire Fire and Rescue Service (LFRS) continues to strengthen its approach to organisational risk management, aligning policy and practice with ISO 31000:2018, National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) guidance, and HM Treasury's Orange Book: Management of Risk – Principles and Concepts. Risk management remains embedded within the Service's governance framework, supporting ongoing scrutiny, informed decision-making and proportionate allocation of resources to risk treatment.
The Corporate Risk Register continues to reflect a broadly stable overall position. Retention and recruitment of on-call staff (11f) and replacement of the existing mobilising system (11g) remain the highest-rated corporate risks. During the latest review cycle, one risk reduced: 1a – Industrial Action.
As reported in June, the Service has also continued to develop its risk management framework through closer alignment with HM Treasury's Orange Book. This includes enhancements to the Corporate Risk Register to improve visibility of risk treatment requirements, resource implications and associated financial considerations, enabling the financial and value-for-money consequences of risk treatment to be considered alongside operational risk exposure.
Recommendation(s)The Audit, Risk and Governance Committee is requested to: · note the Service’s current risk management arrangements; and · note the latest position reflected in the Corporate Risk Matrix and Summary Register at Appendix A.
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Risk management remains a core component of organisational resilience, enabling Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service (LFRS) to anticipate, understand and respond effectively to uncertainty that may impact operational delivery, strategic objectives, financial sustainability or organisational reputation.
The Service continues to operate a tiered approach to risk identification, assessment and escalation, with departmental risk registers informing discussion at Directorate level before escalation to the Corporate Risk Register where risks exceed local tolerance thresholds or present wider organisational implications.
Further work continues to mature the Service's risk management arrangements. This has included reviewing the Corporate Risk Register against HM Treasury's Orange Book: Management of Risk – Principles and Concepts and incorporating additional fields relating to risk treatment planning, resource requirements and financial implications. These enhancements strengthen decision-making by ensuring that the costs, benefits, affordability and practicality of mitigation measures are considered alongside the level of risk exposure.
The corporate risk landscape remains broadly stable, with no significant change to the Service's highest-rated risks. Retention and recruitment of on-call staff (11f) and replacement of the existing mobilising system (11g) continue to represent the most significant areas of organisational exposure. These risks remain influenced by long-term external factors and sector-wide pressures rather than deterioration in internal controls or mitigation activity.
The following change has been identified since the previous report to the Audit Committee.
|
Risk |
Description |
|
1a – Industrial Action |
The likelihood score for the Industrial Action risk has been reduced following acceptance of the 2026 grey book pay settlement, which includes a 3.8% pay award effective from 1 July 2026. The potential impact on LFRS is now assessed as significantly lower. The impact score remains unchanged. |
The Service continues to monitor a range of emerging issues that may influence future risk exposure, including geopolitical instability, economic pressures, workforce challenges, national infrastructure programmes and wider public sector reform. Any material changes will be assessed and incorporated into the Corporate Risk Register through established governance arrangements.
Overall, the risk landscape remains stable, with established governance and mitigation arrangements in place. Several key risks remain subject to external factors, sector-wide pressures and national programme dependencies, and will continue to require active monitoring and oversight.
Failure to maintain an effective risk management system could result in significant operational, financial, legal and reputational impacts, and undermine the Service’s ability to meet statutory duties and strategic objectives. The current arrangements are designed to provide proportionate assurance that material risks are identified, escalated and managed through established governance processes.
There are no direct sustainability or environmental impacts arising from this report. Where relevant, environmental risks and opportunities will continue to be considered through the Corporate Risk Register and associated risk treatment plans.
There are no direct equality and diversity implications arising from this report. Equality, diversity and inclusion considerations will continue to be assessed where individual risk treatment actions, policies or service changes require further development.
Will the proposal(s) involve the processing of personal data? N/A
Improved consistency, governance and reporting will support managers in managing risks proactively, reducing the likelihood of impact on personnel and improving decision-making confidence. Workforce-related risks, including recruitment, retention, wellbeing and capability, will continue to be monitored through the relevant governance routes.
There are no immediate financial approvals arising from this report. However, the risk management system supports financial planning, value-for-money assessments and cost-benefit considerations linked to mitigation, transfer, treatment or acceptance of risk. Where risk treatment requires additional investment, this will be considered through the Medium-Term Financial Strategy (MTFS), budget monitoring and the appropriate decision-making route.
Well-governed risk management supports compliance with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and strengthens organisational assurance in relation to scrutiny and accountability frameworks. Specific legal implications arising from individual risk treatment actions will be considered separately where required.
Paper: Corporate Risk Matrix and Summary Register
Date: 30 June 2026
Contact: Esma Alicehajic, Senior Business Continuity and Emergency Planning Officer
Reason for inclusion in Part 2 if appropriate: Not applicable.
Appendix A: Corporate Risk Matrix and Summary Register
Appendix A
Corporate Risk Matrix and Summary Register

|
Risk ID |
Sub Risk ID |
Risk Cause |
Triggers |
Actions |
|
1 |
|
Loss or lack of staff due to… |
A widespread event or situation that leads to a significant loss of workforce availability and affects the ability to undertake normal business. |
|
|
|
1a |
Industrial Action |
A local or national dispute with a major or multiple unions leading to staff undertaking partial performance or withdrawal of labour |
1) Continue monitoring the position of trade
unions on current and future potential disputes. 9) Monitor the National Pay Reform programme and communicate emerging developments and implications to relevant stakeholders. |
|
|
1b |
Inability to recruit or retain key staff |
Decline in available workforce due to a number
of factors |
1) Continue to monitor through Workforce
Planning arrangements. |
|
|
1c |
Inability to provide sufficient staff in leadership roles |
a. Further to pension changes and turnover there is a need to meet the demand for talented leaders with the ability to work in a changing operating environment |
1) The Service continues to offer leadership
development to supervisory and middle managers. |
|
|
1d |
Pandemic or ill-health epidemic |
An ill-health epidemic or pandemic reducing ability of staff to attend or access to workplace, either due to their own illness, to prevent or reduce transmission and to care for dependants
|
1) Continuation of updating relevant plans and
Health and Safety information in line with newest developments and
research. |
|
2 |
|
Financial Pressures |
Insufficient funding or unbudgeted cost pressures that affect financial sustainability and the ability to maintain critical functions. |
|
|
|
2a |
Loss of funding |
a. Government reduction of grant monies
affecting income |
1) Continue lobbying Government through local
Members and MPs. |
|
|
2b |
Overspending and future financial pressures on the MTFS due to increases in the costs of goods, services and pay |
a. Unexpected event that leads to rise in
costs for goods and services and pay such as Fuel costs due to
Ukraine war, Global recession |
Use of the £0.6 million utility
volatility reserve to help manage short-term movements in energy
costs above budget; |
|
|
2c |
Future financial pressures on MTFS due to changes in legislation
|
a. Changes in building regulations resulting
in higher costs than assumed in the MTFS, for example Building
Research Establishment Environmental Assessment Method (BREEAM)
requirements. |
1) Continue to monitor potential impact,
incorporating relevant assumptions into the draft MTFS.
|
|
|
2d |
Emerging risk associated with grey book pensions and overspending due to increase in costs and administrations associated with changes to pensions |
a. Unexpected changes to the pension schemes due to court rulings. |
1) Follow government guidance and legislative
changes in relation to individual cases. |
|
3 |
|
Loss of Utilities |
An event or situation, malicious or non-malicious, that causes a partial or total loss of utilities services |
|
|
|
3a |
Telecommunications |
Severe weather, Space weather, failure of equipment due to fault or malicious attack on national or local telecoms infrastructure at LFRS and North West Fire Control (NWFC). This could also be due to loss or withdrawal of contracts from suppliers. |
1) Participate in the NWFC business continuity
group to address communication back-up arrangements. |
|
|
3b (i) |
Power outage - Generally |
Severe weather, space weather, failure of
equipment due to fault or malicious attack on national or local
power infrastructure or supply chains.
|
1) Draft a power outage tactical business
continuity plan, informed by the outcome of Business Continuity
Management Group workshops, by Quarter 1 2026-27. |
|
|
3b (ii) |
Power outage - SHQ |
Severe weather, space weather, failure of
equipment due to fault or malicious attack on national or local
power infrastructure or supply chains. |
1) ICT to review the condition of the
uninterruptible power supply (UPS) to the main server room and
provide a report by Quarter 1 2026-27. |
|
|
3b (iii) |
Power outage - LDC |
Severe weather, space weather, failure of
equipment due to fault or malicious attack on national or local
power infrastructure or supply chains. |
1) Isolation of Photovoltaic (PV) panels on
Hangar 54 - requires further investigation to resolve back feed to
the generator issues |
|
|
3c |
Water |
Large scale failure of water company equipment due to fault or malicious attack on national or local processing and pumping infrastructure or supply chains, or failure of private company. |
1) Conduct a gap analysis on water outage on a
county-wide scale, including bottled drinking water, firefighting
water, and hygiene requirements. |
|
|
3d |
Fuel |
Failure of equipment due to fault, incident, industrial action or malicious attack on national or local infrastructure or supply chains. Geopolitical issues affecting access to fuel from international sources. Public behaviour (panic buying as a result of any of above scenarios)
|
1) Ensure that bulk fuel storage is
consistently maintained at a minimum average level of 75% across
all six LFRS locations. |
|
4 |
|
Loss of ICT |
Partial or total loss of physical or electronic and virtual ICT systems due to a fault, accidental damage or malicious attack. |
|
|
|
4a |
Cyber Security |
Partial or total loss of electronic and virtual ICT systems due to a malicious attack. |
1) A Cyber Security Strategy has been approved
by Executive Board. This includes additional managed services to
assist with monitoring the environment, investment in next
generation perimeter defences such as next generation firewalls,
and changes to working practices including stronger password
controls and multi-factor authentication. |
|
|
4b |
Failure of key ICT systems |
Partial or total loss of physical or electronic and virtual ICT systems due to a fault, accidental damage or malicious attack. |
1) Identify a pathway for Azure migration for
data, storage and infrastructure. |
|
5 |
|
Death or Serious injury of… |
An incident that causes the death or serious injury of a person either in or interacting with the Service |
|
|
|
5a |
A member of staff or contractor during work activities |
An incident in the workplace related to general duties e.g. a member of staff involved in a road traffic collision (RTC) whilst undertaking duties, slips trips and falls. |
1) In March 2024, the Health and Safety and Environmental Management Systems underwent an independent audit as part of our ISO 45001 and ISO 14001 certification process. No non-conformances were identified with one opportunity for improvement suggested by the auditor. |
|
|
5b |
A member of staff during operational activities |
An incident enroute to, on an incident ground or in operational training scenario such as falling debris. |
1) In March 2024, the Health and Safety and Environmental Management Systems underwent an independent audit as part of our ISO 45001 and ISO 14001 certification process. No non-conformances were identified with one opportunity for improvement suggested by the auditor. |
|
|
5c |
A member of the public due to Service activities |
An incident or situation that leads to the
death or serious injury of a member of the public. During
operational response, training activities or any other public
interaction, or incident on Service premises. |
1) In March 2024, the Health and Safety and Environmental Management Systems underwent an independent audit as part of our ISO 45001 and ISO 14001 certification process. No non-conformances were identified with one opportunity for improvement suggested by the auditor. |
|
|
5d |
Death of member of staff, visitor or contractor due to on service premises |
An incident or situation on service premises or estate that leads to death or serious injury. Failure to provide appropriate risk assessment, first aid provision and training, damaged or faulty equipment or buildings or structures. |
1) In March 2024, the Health and Safety and Environmental Management Systems underwent an independent audit as part of our ISO 45001 and ISO 14001 certification process. No non-conformances were identified with one opportunity for improvement suggested by the auditor. |
|
|
5e |
Failure to identify and implement learning from past events. |
Failure to properly investigate and implement actions following recommendations, from a near miss, death or serious injury to mitigate risk for the future |
1) In March 2024, the Health and Safety and Environmental Management Systems underwent an independent audit as part of our ISO 45001 and ISO 14001 certification process. No non-conformances were identified with one opportunity for improvement suggested by the auditor. |
|
6 |
|
Change in national legislation requiring additional workloads to assess implement and embed. |
Change in national legislation requiring additional workloads, this might be due to a significant event requiring learning, new government initiatives or change in political landscape |
|
|
|
6a |
Changes to Emergency Response Driver Training which would increase the training requirements for driving |
Change in Fire Standard for Emergency Response Driver Training requiring additional workloads in training |
1) The increase in course duration for
Emergency Response Driver Training is likely to come into force
once section 19 of the Road Safety Act changes. However, the
duration required under the new legislation is still unknown. This
may be partially offset by changes to the trainer-to-student
ratio. |
|
8 |
|
Loss of Service Premises |
An event or situation, malicious or non-malicious, that causes a partial or total loss of a fire service asset |
|
|
|
8b |
Control room |
Severe weather, physical or technical attack or failure, general damage to building, denial of access (due to Protests or Industrial Action), failure of contracts with third party supplier (for joint or co-located premises) |
1) Continue involvement in North West Fire
Control (NWFC) governance structures to assure operations and
business continuity arrangements. |
|
9 |
|
Failure to maximise opportunities |
An event or situation that could provide an opportunity to improve the Service, which if not utilised could have a negative impact on the Service's progress |
|
|
|
9a |
Technological advances |
Failure to maximise the opportunities that technological advances present due to a lack of capacity within the ICT & DT department, and an inability of staff to keep pace with new developments that are implemented |
1) Initiate and mature the Community Developer
concept. |
|
10 |
|
Failure to manage incidents or staff conduct effectively, including inadequate handling of complaints or disciplinary processes, leading to loss of public confidence or reputational damage. |
An incident or situation that results in loss of public or staff confidence due to employee conduct (in the workplace, personal life, or on social media), non-compliance with Service policies, the Core Code of Ethics, or Equality, Diversity and Inclusion (EDI) principles; compounded by negative media coverage or the Service's mismanagement of the response. |
|
|
|
10a |
Failure to provide appropriate communications on events, situations or incidents that could lead to a loss of public confidence in LFRS |
An event or situation relating to, loss of public or staff confidence due to Employee conduct at work, in personal life and on social media, failure to adhere to service policy, core code of ethics, EDI and related negative press, or Sector events. |
1) Social media sessions to be delivered
jointly with HR to address corporate and personal use. |
|
|
10b |
Failure to implement appropriate people processes in response to staff misconduct or complaints. |
Allegations or evidence of staff misconduct (e.g., bullying, harassment, discrimination). Failure to act in line with Service Values, Core Code of Ethics, Staff Code of Conduct or service policy. Delays or inconsistencies in investigations or decision making. Lack of transparency or perceived fairness in internal procedures |
1) Continue delivering training for all line
managers on investigative best practices. |
|
11 |
|
Operational |
An event or situation that could impact on LFRS ability to respond effectively and efficiently. |
|
|
|
11a |
Rapid external fire spread in high rise premises |
An event or situation relating to lack of prevention, protection and operational response leading to a major incident. |
1) Continue built environment awareness
training for operational and community safety staff. |
|
|
11b |
Complete removal of Day Crewing Plus (DCP) |
A challenge from a Union to current local agreement. |
1) Ongoing engagement with staff and Trade
Unions. |
|
|
11c |
Lack of required skills of operational staff |
A situation where operational staff do not possess the required skill to operate safely at an incident |
1) Monitor effectiveness of Operational
Assurance Performance Report in disseminating information. |
|
|
11f |
Retention, development and recruitment of On Call staff |
The failure to recruit and retain on-call staff caused by lack of on-call recruiting strategies, not being perceived as a desirable employer, not being competitive in pay rates, not providing enough flexibility to on-call staff with work arrangements. |
1) Continue the programme of improvement to
identify and make proposals across On Call aimed at improving
recruitment, development and retention. |
|
|
11g |
Replacement of the existing mobilising system as current solution comes to end of life |
Delay in implementing the replacement mobilising system delays with supplier, milestone deliver from the Fire and Rescue Services, lack of consensus project implementation. |
1) Establish the feasibility and cost of
extending the contract with the current mobilising system supplier,
pending legal advice and development of extension options. By
Quarter 1 2026-27, assurance will be gained on cost and
timescales. |
|
|
11i |
Unauthorised access, criminal damage or theft from stations, vehicles, or operational equipment, including during periods when staff may be present on site. |
A spate of break‑ins nationally targeting fire stations or vehicles, including when crew are present or nearby. |
1. Review and update station security risk
assessments for all premises |
|
|
11j |
Failing Pager messages |
Drill towers on station removed which moves the crews to Pagers and away from alerters |
1) Continue internal work to identify routes
away from pagers in favour of the app. |
|
|
11k |
Emergency Services Mobile Communications Programme (ESMCP) and Emergency Services Network (ESN) |
Although the project has now started to increase in pace, with further detail emerging around implementation packages and the associated funding model, recent correspondence from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) dated 28 April 2026 confirmed that national delivery of the project is behind schedule. Current estimates indicate full migration by Quarter 2 2030. This brings into the risk profile the end of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) price cap on Airwave costs on 1 January 2030. This could expose LFRS to a risk of significant cost increases for the period from January 2030 to April 2030. The full details are not yet known, although sector estimates suggest the potential national exposure could be in the region of £10m per week. |
1) Work is ongoing at service, regional and
national levels to prepare for transition to ESN. This is focused
on coverage, transition planning, device support requirements and
integration with existing systems such as Mobile Data Terminals
(MDT) and Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD). |
|
12 |
|
General |
An event or situation that could impact on LFRS |
|
|
|
12a |
Major lack of effective Management of personal data |
A situation or event caused by the lack of effective information management in LFRS |
1) Procedure for ensuring appropriate retention of HR records. |
|
|
12c |
Uncertainty and change arising from Local Government Reorganisation (LGR), devolution proposals or future changes to Fire and Rescue governance arrangements. |
National reform relating to local government structures and Fire and Rescue governance arrangements may create uncertainty and transitional pressures impacting governance, funding, strategic planning, and partnership working.
|
1) Continue to monitor national developments
relating to LGR, devolution and fire governance reform. |
BREEAM Building Research Establishment Environmental Assessment Method
CAD Computer Aided Dispatch
CCTV Closed Circuit TV
CDM Construction Design and Management regulations
CMA Competition and Markets Authority
DCP Day Crewing Plus
DDaT Digital, Data and Technology
DTAG Driver Training Advisory Group
ECR Emergency Cover Review
EDI Equality, Diversity and Inclusion
ESMCP Emergency Services Mobile Communications Programme
ESN Emergency Services Network
LDC Leadership Development Centre
LFRS Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service
LGR Local Government Reorganisation
MDT Mobile Data Terminals
MHCLG Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
MTFS Medium-Term Financial Strategy
NFCC National Fire Chiefs Council
NJC National Joint Council
NWFC North West Fire Control
REP Response and Emergency
RTC Road Traffic Collision
SHQ Service Headquarters
TOIL Time off in lieu
UPS uninterruptible power supply